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LABORATORIES FOR INEQUALITY:
STATE EXPERIMENTATION AND
EDUCATIONAL ACCESS FOR ENGLISHLANGUAGE LEARNERS
MATTHEW P. O’SULLIVAN†
ABSTRACT
Given increased state hostility to minority-language use and states’
ever-changing, though at times inadequate, methods of
accommodating English-language learners, federal intervention is
necessary to protect vulnerable linguistic minorities. But, fueled by the
Supreme Court and Congress since the early 2000s, the federal
government has increasingly accorded greater deference to state
legislatures and local school districts in the area of English-languagelearner (ELL) education. This growing acceptance of “deference not
deserved” ignores evidence of state failure in education of ELLs and
irresponsible state experimentation with the rights of students with
limited English proficiency. It also marks a decided departure from
historical practice in the area of ELL education, though federal
involvement in funding and shaping state education policy is more
firmly entrenched than ever.
Vindicating the ability of ELLs to access a meaningful education
may undercut traditional notions of state control over education
policy generally. But historical practice strongly supports the federal
government’s ability to protect vulnerable linguistic groups by
conditioning federal dollars on the satisfaction of federal education
standards. The spirit of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act,
Supreme Court precedent regarding access to education, and the
Common Core State Standards Initiative’s federalization of school

Copyright © 2015 Matthew P. O’Sullivan.
† Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2015; University of California, Santa
Barbara, B.A. 2011. I would like to express my sincerest thanks to my advisor, Professor Trina
Jones. I would also like to thank the members of the Duke Law Journal for their dedication to
improving this Note.

O’SULLIVAN IN PP (DO NOT DELETE)

12/3/2014 2:24 PM

672

[Vol. 64:671

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

curricula all suggest that Congress should leverage its control over
state education funds to protect ELLs.

INTRODUCTION
Since the 1980s, the states have served as a battleground in a
policy war to establish English as the official language of the United
States. Neither the U.S. Constitution nor any federal statute declares
English as the nation’s official language, even though over 230 million
1
Americans speak English within the home. This absence of an
officially declared language stands in stark contrast to the United
2
3
States’s neighbor countries of Canada and Mexico, as well as most of
4
Europe. Though Congress has repeatedly failed to make English the
national language of the United States, upwards of thirty states have
sought to preserve English as the language of their governments
through constitutional amendments, referenda, and statutes.
Although the content of these state policies differs, some have
disadvantaged recent immigrants to the United States, and have
stripped away from non-English speakers the ability to complete even
5
6
the most basic exercises, such as voting or driving cars.
The federal government, however, has come to the aid of a
certain subset of non-English speakers. Thanks to the Equal
7
Educational Opportunities Act of 1974 (EEOA), which allows for
actions against a state for failure to accommodate non-Englishlanguage students, primary- and secondary-school students have
traditionally benefited from federal oversight of state action targeted
at inhibiting their educational access. Yet interpretations of the

1. CAMILLE RYAN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, LANGUAGE USE IN THE UNITED STATES:
2011, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY REPORTS 3 tbl.1 (2013), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/acs-22.pdf.
2. Cristina M. Rodríguez, Language and Participation, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 687, 745 (2006).
3. See Ley General de Derechos Lingüísticos de los Pueblos Indígenas [General Law of
Linguistic Rights of Indigenous Peoples], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 13 de Marzo de
2003 (Mex.) (placing the indigenous languages of Mexico on the same plane as Spanish, calling
them “lenguas nacionales” [national languages]). Mexico does not explicitly declare Spanish as
its official language anywhere in its laws.
4. See Robert Huntington, Note, European Unity and the Tower of Babel, 9 B.U. INT’L
L.J. 321, 324 n.14 (1991) (surveying European laws that create official national languages).
5. Cristina M. Rodríguez, Language Diversity in the Workplace, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1689,
1716 n.108 (2006).
6. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 278–79 (2001).
7. 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (2012).
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EEOA and the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA) have allowed
the promise of adequate access to education to go unsupervised,
permitting the states to adopt sweeping reforms as part of their
9
control over education. Recently, in Horne v. Flores, the Supreme
Court further approved of this delegation to the states of the power to
determine the appropriate means of accommodating English10
language-learner (ELL) students. In doing so, the Court severely
eroded one of the principal means of protection for non-Englishspeaking residents of this country: federal intervention to prevent
harmful or ill-informed state policies.
This Note argues that the federal government has given the state
governments a great deal of deference—a deference undeserved in
the face of state failure—in setting policy for ELL students. Potential
animus toward these groups, coupled with the dangers of
experimentation in this area, forecast a bleak future for ELLs if the
status quo prevails. As a result, this Note proposes that increased
federal control or oversight is both necessary and appropriate to
ensure universal access to a meaningful education for all children in
the United States, regardless of language capacity. Whereas scholars
have discussed the subject of adequate accommodations for ELLs
and the impact of Horne on this group, this Note is the first piece in
the academic literature to tie shifts in education policy to the greater
English-only movement, and to reflect upon the ways in which states
have experimented in this area.
Part I of this Note discusses the history of immigration and
multilingualism in the United States. Part II addresses early case law
and also legislation designed to protect access to education, focusing
particularly on Congress’s passage of the EEOA. Part III addresses
the English-only movement as a reaction to the increasingly diverse
makeup of the American people. Part IV considers the growing
acceptance of experimentation following the passage of the NCLBA
and the Supreme Court’s decision in Horne. Part V discusses the
danger of state experimentation and the additional fear of state

8. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified
primarily in 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (2012)).
9. Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009).
10. The academic and legal literature on this topic employs a variety of labels for students
with below-average English proficiency, using interchangeably the terms Limited-English
Proficient (LEP), English as a Second Language (ESL), or English-Language Learner (ELL).
Because Flores—the seminal Supreme Court case exploring this topic—employs the term
“English-language learner,” this Note does so as well.
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animus toward ELLs, and explains why Congress both can and should
intervene to protect this group. Finally, Part VI suggests methods the
federal government can adopt to counterbalance the need for state
experimentation in educating ELLs with the need to provide
adequate education to students whose native language is not English.
I. THE CHANGING DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE UNITED STATES
Despite the ubiquity of English-language use in the United
States, the United States has a long history of multilingualism. In the
Colonial period and the Early Republic, language diversity was
11
Bilingualism
and
prevalent
among
American
settlers.
multilingualism “existed in public and private schools, newspapers,
and religious and social institutions” well into the first half of the
12
twentieth century. Publishers produced documents as important as
the Articles of Confederation in German, and the federal government
printed other legislative or governmental papers in French, Dutch,
13
and Swedish. Translations of the Federal Constitution into German
and Dutch likewise played an important role in ensuring its
14
ratification in New York and Pennsylvania, respectively.
As the states formed, and later established the United States,
vestiges of European colonialism shaped language use in the states’
early histories. French culture and language dominated the political
and social scenes of early New Orleans, and the Louisiana legislature
15
enacted laws in French well into the 1900s. California and New
Mexico both recognized the utility of publishing official documents in
Spanish long after coming under U.S. control in the mid-nineteenth
century, signaling the importance of the language to a sizeable—and
16
powerful—part of its population. Before Texas began its long
process of independence and annexation into the United States, the

11. Shirley Brice Heath, English in Our Language Heritage, in LANGUAGE IN THE USA 6,
7 (Charles A. Ferguson, Shirley Brice Heath & David Hwang eds., 1981).
12. Id.
13. Yuval Merin, The Case Against Official Monolingualism: The Idiosyncrasies of
Minority Language Rights in Israel and the United States, 6 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 10
(1999).
14. Christina Mulligan, Michael Douma, Hans Lind & Brian Patrick Quinn, Founding-Era
Translations of the United States Constitution 6, 10 (Aug. 24, 2014) (unpublished manuscript)
(papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2486301).
15. Adriana Resendez, The Spanish Predominant Language Ordinance: Is Spanish on the
Way In and English on the Way Out?, 32 ST. MARY’S L.J. 317, 326, 328 (2001).
16. Id. at 328 n.37.
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Mexican government recognized the language rights of American
settlers by declaring English as a co-official language alongside
17
Spanish in the territory. After declaring independence, the Republic
of Texas continued this tradition by providing governmental services
18
in English, German, and Czech, among other languages.
Yet the language panorama of the United States has changed in
recent years due to an increase of non-English-speaking individuals
and their children within the country. Restrictions on immigration
policy originating around the time of World War I made it so that, by
the 1960s, the United States was a “more uniformly English-speaking
19
country than it had been at any time since the 1840s.” This
20
demographic uniformity changed with immigration reform in 1965,
however, more definitively opening the United States’s doors to
immigrants from Asia and Latin America. This shift in immigration
policy caused an explosion of immigration by non-English-speakers—
half of the thirty million newcomers arriving in the United States
21
between the 1960s and 1990s hailed from Latin America alone.
The increasing diversity of the United States’s new residents
following the 1965 immigration reform has continued to the present
day. As the 2010 Census notes, of the 27.3 million new people since
the last census, the “vast majority of the growth . . . came from
increases in those who reported their race(s) as something other than
White alone and those who reported their ethnicity as Hispanic or
22
Latino.” Since the last census in 2000, “Hispanics or Latinos of any
23
race” have grown from comprising about 13 percent of the total

17. José Roberto Juárez, Jr., The American Tradition of Language Rights: The Forgotten
Right to Government in a “Known Tongue,” 13 LAW & INEQ. 443, 458–59 (1995).
18. Id. at 459.
19. DAVID FRUM, HOW WE GOT HERE: THE 70S: THE DECADE THAT BROUGHT YOU
MODERN LIFE (FOR BETTER OR WORSE) 268 (2000).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 269.
22. KAREN R. HUMES, NICHOLAS A. JONES & ROBERTO R. RAMIREZ, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, OVERVIEW OF RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: 2010, at 3 (2011), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-02.pdf.
23. This Note employs the term Hispanic going forward. The U.S. Census Bureau defines
“Hispanic” or “Latino” as “a person of Cuban, Mexican, Puerto Rican, South or Central
American, or other culture or origin regardless of race.” SHARON R. ENNIS, MERARYS RÍOSVARGAS, AND NORA G. ALBERT, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE HISPANIC POPULATION: 2010, at
2 (May 2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-04.pdf. Although
the use of this terminology to describe those who are either Spanish-speaking or Portuguesespeaking, or who trace their ancestry to countries that predominantly speak Spanish or
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United States population to now making up roughly 16 percent.
Asian Americans, for their part, are one of the fastest-growing groups
in the United States, numbering more than fourteen million people,
25
or nearly 5 percent of the population. This number marks an
26
increase from 3.6 percent in 2000.
Importantly, not only has the number of Hispanic and Asian
Americans increased, but they now live in states with historically low
27
numbers of Hispanics and Asians. Gone are the days when
California, Texas, New York, and Florida were the only places where
these two groups settled. Utah and Nevada, for instance, have seen a
growth in the Hispanic population within their borders far
outstripping the national average, with increases in the total number
of Hispanics by 84 percent and 89 percent, respectively, from 2000 to
28
2010. The percentage of the nationwide Hispanic population living
in California, Texas, Florida, Arizona, New Mexico, New York, New
29
Jersey, and Illinois, moreover, has decreased in recent years. In
1990, 83 percent of Hispanics lived in these eight states alone, while
30
today roughly 74 percent do.
Interestingly, the states with the highest proportions of foreignborn Hispanics are Maryland, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina,
31
Virginia, Alabama, Tennessee, Louisiana, and South Carolina.
Excluding Florida, none of these states have historically witnessed a
significant Hispanic presence, nor do they currently have large or
32
robust Hispanic populations. Although all states chafe under the
burden of providing services to non-English speakers, the states to
Portuguese, is controversial, the fact that the U.S. Census uses this term guides this Note when
referring to this group.
24. Id. at 4 tbl.1.
25. Id. at 4.
26. Id.
27. PEW HISPANIC CTR., THE NEW LATINO SOUTH: THE CONTEXT AND CONSEQUENCES
OF RAPID POPULATION GROWTH i–ii (2005), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/
50.1.pdf.
28. Stephen E. Reil, Who Gets Counted? Jury List Representativeness for Hispanics in
Areas with Growing Hispanic Populations Under Duren v. Missouri, 2007 BYU L. REV. 201, 201
(2007).
29. ANNA BROWN & MARK HUGO LOPEZ, PEW RESEARCH CTR., MAPPING THE LATINO
POPULATION, BY STATE, COUNTY, AND CITY 4 (2013), available at http://www.pewhispanic.org/
files/2013/08/latino_populations_in_the_states_counties_and_cities_FINAL.pdf.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 10 tbl.5.
32. See id. at 4 (listing those states to which Hispanic immigrants traditionally moved and
settled after arrival in the United States).
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which new Latin American immigrants are moving are especially ill33
equipped to respond to their needs.
Merely looking to the number of Hispanic Americans and Asian
Americans living in the United States to determine the number of
non-English speakers within the country is, admittedly, problematic.
It goes without saying that a great number of Asian and Hispanic
34
Americans not only speak English, but speak English well. The U.S.
Census Bureau’s statistics related to non-English speakers, collected
35
since 1890, are likewise misleading. Of the over sixty million people
in the United States who speak a language other than English at
home, thirty-seven million speak Spanish and roughly eight million
36
speak an Asian or Pacific Islander language. Not all of those who
primarily speak languages other than English need English-language
instruction, however. Over 55 percent of those the Census Bureau
surveyed who spoke Spanish at home reported that they spoke
37
English “very well.” Among Asian-language speakers, the ability to
speak English “very well” ranged from a low of 39 percent among
Vietnamese-Americans to a high of 69 percent among speakers of
38
“other Asian languages.”
The number of students who require assistance learning English
is at least partially ascertainable. In 2002, 8.7 percent of all students
participated in English-language assistance programs in American
39
public elementary and secondary schools. This percentage of the
population has grown in recent years, as 9.8 percent required such

33. JERRY JOHNSON, THE RURAL SCH. & CMTY. TRUST, WHY RURAL MATTERS 2007:
THE REALITIES OF RURAL EDUCATION GROWTH vi, 32 (Oct. 2007), available at
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED498859.pdf (noting that ELL populations are growing
disproportionately in the rural Southeast, where they face “less than favorable policy
environments”); SERVE, ENGLISH LANGUAGE LEARNERS IN THE SOUTHEAST, RESEARCH,
POLICY, & PRACTICE 1, 81 (2004), available at http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED485206.pdf
(discussing the potential difficulties facing ELLs in the Southeast, where the “rapid increase in
the ELL population” faces a “paucity of resources, such as certified ESL and bilingual teachers,
funding, and research”).
34. For a breakdown of the English-speaking ability of people who speak languages other
than English at home, see RYAN, supra note 1, at 5 tbl.2.
35. Id. at 1.
36. Id. at 3 tbl.1.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Table 47. Number and Percentage of Public School Students Participating in Programs
for English Language Learners, by State: Selected Years, 2002-03 through 2010-11, NAT’L CTR.
FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d12/tables/dt12_047.asp (last visited
Nov. 29, 2014).
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assistance in 2009. There has been an increased presence in some
states of these students, similar to the shift in the states in which
Hispanics live generally. For example, roughly 4 percent of North
Carolina students received English-language assistance in schools in
41
42
2003. In 2011, this number had increased to just over 7 percent.
South Carolina, for its part, saw an increase from 1 percent of its
43
students in such programs to 5 percent in the same eight-year span.
Considered alone, these statistics are staggering. We must also
ask, however, about those people who live in the United States but
who the Census may not necessarily capture. In January 2011, the
Department of Homeland Security estimated the number of
44
unauthorized immigrants living in the United States as 11.6 million,
and previous nongovernmental estimates suggest that the number
45
may be even higher. Many members of this population presumably
avoid being counted in the Census, though they still access American
46
educational facilities. What is definitively known, however, is that
ELLs have entered the nation’s public schools in ever-increasing
numbers, despite the misgivings of many state governments about the
changing ethnic and linguistic backgrounds of the students they are
responsible for educating.
II. EDUCATION AND THE COURTS
Though the United States’s early history of diverse language
patterns often goes overlooked, education has been an area of both
historical and current legislative attention. This Part examines various
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. MICHAEL HOEFER, NANCY RYTINA & BRYAN BAKER, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT
POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2011, at 3 (2012), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2011.pdf.
45. See, e.g., Fred Elbel, How Many Illegal Aliens Are in the U.S.?, SOCIAL CONTRACT 241,
248 (Summer 2007) (critiquing the government’s estimation methods and providing data
suggesting that “it is likely that up to 20 million illegal aliens presently reside in the United
States”); ROBERT JUSTICH & BETTY NG, BEAR STEARNS, THE UNDERGROUND LABOR FORCE
IS RISING TO THE SURFACE 1 (2005) (“The number of illegal immigrants in the United States
may be as high as 20 million people . . . .”).
46. See Jennifer Galassi, Dare to Dream? A Review of the Development, Relief, and
Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, 24 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 79, 81 (2003) (noting
that at least fifty thousand undocumented students graduate from American public high schools
every year).
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Supreme Court cases dealing with the critical question of access to
education in the United States. It likewise discusses federal
intervention into education, a realm traditionally occupied by the
state governments.
A. Supreme Court Precedent Regarding the Importance of Universal
Access to Education
The existence (or nonexistence) of a constitutional right to a
meaningful education is complex, to say the least. In a 1973 case, San
47
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the Supreme
Court seemed to dismiss the possibility that such a right exists. Texas
had allotted funding to schools partially on the basis of local property
48
taxes, meaning that students attending schools in wealthier areas
received access to greater potential sources for education
49
expenditures than students in poorer districts. The petitioner argued
that this discrepancy denied some students the same education as
50
others. The Court, however, did not find the funding scheme
unconstitutional. The majority first conceded that “education is
perhaps the most important function of state and local
51
governments.” Despite this assertion, the Court added that a
citizen’s meaningful education “is not among the rights afforded
explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor . . . [is there]
52
any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.”
But Rodriguez and its conception of the role played by education
do not exist in a case-law vacuum. Both earlier and later Court
opinions have added context to its meaning and impact. In Meyer v.
53
Nebraska, for example, the Court simultaneously extolled the value
of education and the importance of the freedom to both speak and
54
teach in a foreign language. In this case, a state law—passed in the

47.
48.
Dupre,
(2004).
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
Most states use this model to determine school funding. See John Dayton & Anne
School Funding Litigation: Who’s Winning the War?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2351, 2356
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 14–16.
Id.
Id. at 29 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
Id. at 35.
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
Id. at 403.
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midst of World War I anti-German hysteria —forbade any “person,
individually or as a teacher, . . . [to] teach any subject to any person in
56
any language [other] than the English language.” Finding that this
law did not permit “foreigners, who had taken residence in this
country, to rear and educate their children in the language of their
57
native land,” the Court struck down the policy as a violation of the
58
Fourteenth Amendment’s due-process guarantee. More importantly,
the Court also asserted that “[t]he American people have always
regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as matters of
59
supreme importance which should be diligently promoted.”
The Court later downplayed the key language in Rodriguez when
60
it decided Plyler v. Doe in 1982. The majority found unconstitutional
61
a Texas law that defunded education for undocumented children.
The Court held that access to education, while not a right protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment, stands for something much greater
than a “benefit indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare
62
legislation.” Legislation that shuts undocumented children out of
schools “foreclose[s] any realistic possibility that they will contribute
63
in even the smallest way to the progress of our Nation.” Because of
the potentially momentous impact illegal-alien exclusionary laws
could have on education, the Court concluded that the state could
64
have no rational basis for implementing them. The Court also
discussed the tenuous place occupied by undocumented immigrants
within American society as a whole: without education, this “shadow
population” would forever be excluded from opportunity and success
65
in the United States. Such a situation would present “most difficult
55. Lynn D. Wardle, Preference for Marital Couple Adoption—Constitutional and Policy
Reflections, 5 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 345, 350 n.17 (2003).
56. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 397.
57. Id. at 397–98.
58. Id. at 399 (“Without doubt, [the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment]
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract,
to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential
to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”).
59. Id. at 400.
60. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982).
61. Id. at 205–06, 229–30.
62. Id. at 221 (quotation marks omitted).
63. Id. at 223.
64. Id. at 240.
65. Id. at 218.
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problems for a Nation that prides itself on adherence to the principles
66
of equality under law.”
These cases therefore depict education as something akin to a
67
quasi-right. Even absent legislation, the federal judiciary has
promoted and celebrated the role of education in American society.
It is on this bedrock principle—the importance of education for all
persons living in the United States—that the federal government has
chipped away at state control over schools through its use of
aggressive legislation.
B. Federal Intervention, Statutory Rights, and the Response of the
Courts
Though the courts have played a pivotal role in clarifying the
importance of education, federal legislation has complemented and
advanced these efforts. The traditional conception that states,
uniquely, hold the power to dictate education policy is a well68
established norm of American federalism. Massachusetts first
enacted a regime of mandatory public education beginning in 1640.
The Old Deluder Satan Act—named after its memorable opening
line—sought to require colony-wide education so that children would
69
be able to resist the “inducements of Satan.” As the nation formed,
it became the general rule that local and state governments would
prescribe the educational methods and goals of their respective
70
citizens. Although the federal Constitution makes no mention of
education, all fifty state constitutions include clauses related to state
71
control over the power to instruct children.
66. Id. at 218–19.
67. See Jeffrey D. Straussman, Rights Based Budgeting, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN BUDGET
THEORY 103–04 (Irene Rubin ed., 1988) (noting that “[a]t the local level, public education is a
quasi-right,” because although public education is not constitutionally guaranteed, it enjoys
significant protection through federal use of conditioned grants to the states); Sarah G. Boyce,
Note, The Obsolescence of San Antonio v. Rodriguez in the Wake of the Federal Government’s
Quest to Leave No Child Behind, 61 DUKE L.J. 1025, 1051–52 (2012) (noting that the
precedential value of cases declaring that education is not a right protected by the Constitution
is “unclear,” and suggesting that it is an implicitly protected right).
68. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2628 (2012) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (noting that education is an area “where States historically have been sovereign”
(quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995))).
69. Massachussetts School Law of 1647 (Old Deluder Satan Act), reprinted in EDUCATION
IN THE UNITED STATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 393 (Sol Cohen ed., 1974).
70. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 (1995).
71. Barry Friedman & Sara Solow, The Federal Right to an Adequate Education, 81 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 92, 129 (2013).
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Despite this history of state control over education, a
monumental shift toward federal intervention occurred with the
72
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In relevant part, Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act guaranteed that all Americans would live free
from discrimination based on “race, color or national origin . . . [in]
73
program[s] or activit[ies] receiving Federal financial assistance.”
Congress intended that the Act’s regulation over “program[s] or
activit[ies]” would cover race and national-origin discrimination in
state public schools, forcing the hand of many states that had not yet
74
complied with judicial desegregation orders. This federal regulation
shattered the racially bifurcated school system that had developed
within parts of the country, and inserted the federal government into
75
oversight of state control in a manner never before experienced.
The use of the Civil Rights Act to promote the interests of ELLs
was short-lived, though its legacy shaped later legislation that aided
this group. The first and only Supreme Court case to deal with ELLs
76
as a protected group under the Civil Rights Act was Lau v. Nichols.
In Lau, the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) had issued a memorandum, which purported to “clarify . . .
[its] policy” regarding discrimination under the Civil Rights Act,
extending that policy’s protection to students with limited English
77
proficiency. In particular, the memorandum required “affirmative
78
steps to rectify the language deficiency” of ELL students.
A group of Chinese-speaking ELL students in a San Francisco
79
school brought suit against the school district in 1974, possibly
conscious of the agency’s purported clarification of the Civil Rights
Act. These ELLs claimed that subjecting them to an English-only
education alongside English-fluent peers denied them a meaningful
education, violating the Fourteenth Amendment and other relevant

72. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
73. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VI, 78 Stat. 252
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d−2000d-4a (2012)).
74. Deborah Mayo-Jeffries, Discrimination in the Education Process Based on Race, 21
N.C. CENT. L.J. 21, 22 (1995).
75. Lino A. Graglia, The Busing Disaster, 2 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 13, 14 (1992).
76. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
77. Identification of Discrimination and Denial of Services on the Basis of National Origin,
35 Fed. Reg. 11,595 (July 18, 1970).
78. Id.
79. Lau, 414 U.S. at 564–65.
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80

law. In its analysis, the Supreme Court declined to address the
Fourteenth Amendment issue and instead focused on the Civil Rights
81
Act. Though language ability or preference is not a protected
characteristic under the Civil Rights Act, the Supreme Court allowed
for the implementation and enforcement of HEW’s new policy to
“rectify the language deficiency [of ELL students] in order to
82
open . . . [academic] instruction” to this ignored subset of students.
Although ordering no specific remedy itself, the Court’s decision
allowed for the implementation of bilingual education for these
83
students.
C. The EEOA and Appropriate Action
Congress partially codified the holding in Lau by passing the
EEOA mere months after the decision. The EEOA, in § 1703(f),
specified that state educational agencies must “take appropriate
action to overcome language barriers that impede [the] equal
84
participation” of non-English-speaking students. Failure to do so
leaves a state or school authority liable “only [for] such remedies as
85
are essential to correct” the denials of the educational opportunity.
Importantly, as part of this legislation, Congress also authorized
86
students to vindicate their rights under the EEOA in federal court.
The Attorney General, similarly, may bring suit on behalf of the
87
United States when it appears that a state has violated the statute.
The EEOA, as crafted, poorly protects ELLs from state harm.
To begin with, the EEOA seems almost entirely concerned with the
eradication of school segregation and the vestiges of the dual school

80. Id.
81. Id. at 566.
82. Id. at 566–67.
83. The Court noted that “[n]o specific remedy [was] urged” to rectify the district’s failure,
id. at 564, and “remand[ed] the case for the fashioning of appropriate relief,” id. at 569. Still,
California law provided that the accommodation for an ELL would be “instruction . . . given
bilingually.” See id. at 565 (quotation mark omitted). The Ninth Circuit, too, stated that the
students requested “bilingual compensatory education” as relief when it heard the case. Lau v.
Nichols, 483 F.2d 791, 793 (9th Cir. 1973).
84. 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (2012).
85. Id. § 1712.
86. See id. § 1706 (“An individual denied an equal educational opportunity . . . may
institute a civil action in an appropriate district court of the United States . . . .”).
87. Id.
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system in the United States. The text of the EEOA, moreover, says
nothing about the form that “appropriate action” must take. Two
proposed methods dominate the debate in this area: bilingual
education and structured English immersion. Bilingual education
89
involves teaching students in both English and their native language.
Structured English immersion, a more recent alternative, entails
teaching English rapidly and dedicating a great deal of time to that
90
end. Finally, the penalty available for a failure to accommodate
ELLs is the imposition of “only such remedies . . . essential to
91
correct” the particular denials of equal educational facilities. The
absence of a stronger punishment, such as the removal of all funds for
states that fail to accommodate ELLs, differs from the punitive
92
scheme provided for violations of Title VI. This likewise means that
state governments face far greater punishment for discrimination on
the basis of race than they do for national-origin discrimination.
93
The legislative history surrounding the law suggests that
Congress did not intend to allow the judiciary to fashion its own
94
interpretation of the EEOA. Instead, the scant evidence indicates
that Congress envisioned bilingual education as the form of
95
accommodation that the states would adopt. Earlier legislation, for
instance, suggests this trend. Congress had passed the Bilingual
Education Act only six years earlier, evincing its preference for this

88. The Congressional findings associated with the EEOA, for instance, reference dual
school systems five times, transportation (busing) five times, and desegregation one time. See id.
§ 1702. Discriminatory policy against ELLs is directly referenced only once in the entire EEOA.
See id. § 1703(f) (referencing “the failure by an educational agency to take appropriate action to
overcome language barriers”).
89. Kristi L. Bowman, Pursuing Educational Opportunities for Latino/a Students, 88 N.C. L.
REV. 911, 923 (2010).
90. Id. at 977 n.329.
91. 20 U.S.C. § 1712.
92. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.3 (2015) (noting that the “ultimate sanctions under title VI” include
the “termination of assistance being rendered”).
93. Little legislative history exists for the bill passed by Congress in 1974. A greater body of
legislative history exists for the bill’s earlier iteration, which failed to pass in 1972. Most scholars
cite the history of the 1972 bill when referencing the 1974 act. For a longer discussion of this
trend, see, for example, Jeffrey Mongiello, The Future of the Equal Educational Opportunities
Act § 1703(f) After Horne v. Flores: Using No Child Left Behind Proficiency Levels to Define
Appropriate Action Towards Meaningful Educational Opportunity, 14 HARV. LATINO L. REV.
211, 218–19 (2011).
94. Martin Luther King Jr. Elementary Sch. Children in Green Rd. Hous. Project v. Mich.
Bd. of Educ., 451 F. Supp. 1324, 1331–32 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
95. Mongiello, supra note 93, at 219.
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method of education. The first iteration of the Bilingual Education
Act provided additional financial assistance to “States and areas
within States having the greatest need for [bilingual] programs” that
“develop and carry out new and imaginative elementary and
secondary school programs designed to meet . . . [the] needs” of
97
children with limited English-speaking ability. Contemporary
studies, moreover, suggested that the bilingual-education model not
only aided Mexican-American students in succeeding academically,
98
but also improved self-esteem in the classroom. Congress’s approval
of bilingual education was a reaction to the English-only education
99
policies developed in the post–World War I environment. And most
importantly, pursuant to the decision in Lau, the Office of Civil
Rights released a series of guidelines that “essentially promoted
100
transitional bilingual programs” for the following six years. The
threatened withholding of federal funds for a failure to adopt such
programs prompted over five hundred school districts to implement
101
bilingual education.
Yet despite any nontextual or background indications of
Congress’s will, the term “appropriate action” is still so ill-defined
that a district court must fashion its own meaning of these words to
102
adjudicate an EEOA claim. Lacking guidance, the circuits therefore
differ somewhat on the standard to be applied in determining
whether a state or locality has created suitable accomodations for
ELLs. Importantly, for instance, the Ninth Circuit has interpreted the
EEOA to hold state governments directly responsible for their failure
to ensure that local school districts have adequately accommodated
103
104
ELLs. In Idaho Migrant Council v. Board of Education, the Ninth

96. Sandra Cortes, Note, A Good Lesson for Texas: Learning How to Adequately Assist
Language-Minorities To Learn English, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 95, 104 (2006).
97. Bilingual Education Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-247, 81 Stat. 783, 816–18 (1968).
98. Bethany Li, Note, From Bilingual Education to OELALEAALEPS: How the No Child
Left Behind Act Has Undermined English Language Learners’ Access to a Meaningful
Education, 14 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 539, 549 (2007).
99. Cortes, supra note 96, at 104.
100. David Nieto, Commentary, A Brief History of Bilingual Education in the United States,
PERSPECTIVES ON URBAN EDUC., Spring 2009, at 61, 64, available at
http://www.urbanedjournal.org/sites/urbanedjournal.org/files/pdf_archive/61-72--Nieto.pdf.
101. DOUGLAS S. REED, BUILDING THE FEDERAL SCHOOLHOUSE: LOCALISM AND THE
AMERICAN EDUCATION 166 (2014).
102. Jessica R. Berenyi, Note, “Appropriate Action,” Inappropriately Defined: Amending the
Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 639, 657–58 (2008).
103. Idaho Migrant Council v. Bd. of Educ., 647 F.2d 69, 70 (9th Cir. 1981).
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Circuit found that although Idaho’s constitution already required
such state supervision of local compliance, the EEOA separately
imposed a burden upon state governments to ensure school-district
adherence to its strictures even when a state constitutional provision
105
does not so require. This decision greatly expanded state liability
under the EEOA, as the only court to have previously considered the
issue imposed state liability after considering state entrenchment in
106
education policy as a factual matter. Other courts seeking to piece
together the meaning of the statute found the Idaho Migrant Council
107
interpretation useful.
One case stands above all others, however, in guiding lower
court interpretation of the appropriate action states must take under
108
the law for ELLs. In Castaneda v. Pickard, the Fifth Circuit adopted
109
a three-prong test to adjudicate claims under the EEOA. First, a
court must determine whether the state’s educational theory is sound,
though the Castaneda judges expressly noted that Congress did not
intend to mandate which method of education would be the most
110
appropriate. Second, the court must review the policy to ensure that
it is not a dead letter, but that the state has instead dedicated
111
adequate “practices, resources and personnel.” Third, even if these
first two prongs are met, the court can consider the actual
achievement record of students in determining whether or not a state
112
plan has produced the desired educational access for ELLs.
In addition to providing a structure to judicially review EEOA
cases, the Castaneda decision decidedly allowed for state control over
104. Idaho Migrant Council, 647 F.2d 69.
105. Id. at 70–71.
106. See United States v. Sch. Dist. of Ferndale, Mich., 577 F.2d 1339, 1347 (6th Cir. 1978)
(holding that “the State can[not] escape liability under the Act merely because its support for
the proscribed actions was indirect” when there existed “substantial control exerted by
Michigan officials over local school operations”).
107. United States v. Texas, 601 F.3d 354, 365 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Both state and local
educational agencies are responsible for taking ‘appropriate action’ under the statute . . . .”);
Gomez v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030, 1042–43 (7th Cir. 1987) (“[T]he obligation to
take ‘appropriate action’ falls on both state and local educational authorites.”); United States v.
City of Yonkers, 880 F. Supp. 212, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“[T]he plain language of the [EEOA]
seems to provide a basis for holding a state vicariously liable for the discriminatory acts of local
educational authorities”).
108. Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981).
109. Id. at 1009–10.
110. Id. at 1009.
111. Id. at 1010 (emphasis added).
112. Id.
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the type of accommodations ELLs receive. The second prong of the
court’s test, however, targeted state allocation of resources as a
method to invalidate legislative or local policy. As such, Castaneda at
least theoretically allowed a court to forestall an inadequately funded
plan for educating ELLs before it goes into effect, and allows
resources to serve as a benchmark for the appropriateness of state
114
action. Castaneda gained approbation from at least one other
115
116
circuit and multiple district courts before being discussed by the
117
Supreme Court in its analysis in Horne.
III. ENGLISH: THE OFFICIAL LANGUAGE OF THE UNITED STATES?
Although the United States has a long history of both
118
the state and federal
multiculturalism and multilingualism,
governments have frequently sought to limit the impact of “nonAmerican” influences on American society generally. The Englishonly movement is one such reaction to increasing immigration and
multilingualism; it seeks to promote the use and acceptance of the
English language by newly arrived immigrant groups. The next
Section details the birth of the modern English-only movement, as
well as the role the federal government has played in limiting its
reach.
A. The States React: The English-Only Movement
A significant backlash has manifested itself within the states in
response to the growing population of Asian and Hispanic
immigrants in the United States, and to the concomitant (though
smaller) growth in the use of Spanish and other languages. Today, as

113. Id. at 1009.
114. Id. at 1010.
115. See Gomez v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030, 1041–42 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that
the inquiry includes the pre-implementation evaluation of “whether the programs and practices
actually used by a school system are reasonably calculated to implement effectively the
educational theory advanced by the school”).
116. Valeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1017–21 (E.D. Cal. 1998); Quiroz v. State Bd.
of Ed., 1997 WL 661163 1, at *4–5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 1997); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver,
Colo., 576 F. Supp. 1503, 1510 (D. Colo. 1983).
117. Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 477–78 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Courts in other
Circuits have followed Castaneda’s approach. No Circuit Court has denied its validity.”
(citations omitted)).
118. See supra notes 12–18 and accompanying text.
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one incarnation of this hostility, a great many states have declared
119
English as the official language of their governments.
The earliest anti-minority-language laws date back to World War
120
I. German Americans, the largest immigrant group in the United
States at that time, came under suspicion following the
121
commencement of hostilities against the German Empire. State
laws, like the one in Meyer, attacked the use of the German language
122
as part of nativist paranoia over the loyalty of these Americans.
Equating English-speaking with patriotism following a time of war
and ongoing hostility meant that only one language—English—could
safely be used in arenas of public discourse, and particularly in
123
schools. After a brief period during which language restrictions did
not frequently appear, nativism again resurged after fifteen million
aliens, mostly of Hispanic or Asian descent, entered the country
124
between 1980 and the mid-1990s.
When the growth of the
immigrant population in urban areas exploded, native-born
125
Americans flocked to suburban and rural areas. But apart from
engaging in this so-called “white flight,” some native-born Americans
also began a lobbying movement to pass legislation to ensure that
Anglo-American culture and the English language remained
dominant in the face of the United States’s changing demographic
composition.
126
The modern English-only, or official-English, movement began
127
in 1981 when Senator Samuel Ichiye Hayakawa introduced a

119. Hunter Schwarz, States Where English Is the Official Language, WASH. POST, Aug. 12,
2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/08/12/states-where-english-is-theofficial-language.
120. Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cultural
Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269, 329–30 (1992).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 330.
124. Thomas Muller, Nativism in the Mid-1990s: Why Now?, in IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE
NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 105, 105–06
(Juan F. Perea ed., 1997).
125. Id.
126. Both “English-only” and “official English” have been employed, depending on the
terms and purpose of the statute or constitutional amendment. This Note uses the term
“English-only” laws to describe those enactments that officially promote English-language use.
Not only is this terminology more dominant in the literature, but it also better captures that
even the most innocuous pieces of legislation at times precede more restrictive laws.
127. Senator Hayakawa was born in Canada to Japanese parents. Before serving as a U.S.
senator from California, he was an English professor in the United States. After leaving office,

O’SULLIVAN IN PP (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

12/3/2014 2:24 PM

LABORATORIES FOR INEQUALITY

689

constitutional amendment to establish English as the official language
128
of the United States. In a speech to Congress, Senator Hayakawa
noted that declaring English as the sole language of the United States
was necessary because “separate languages can fracture and fragment
129
a society.” His vision of the proposed amendment would likewise
prevent the government from “requir[ing] multilingual signs,” though
he expressly noted that communities would be free to provide
130
services in languages other than English where necessary. Senator
Hayakawa also made it clear that “Yiddish schools, Hispanic schools,
Japanese, and Chinese schools” would be permitted in an officialEnglish America, but only if they derived support from outside of the
131
public coffers. Although this amendment ultimately failed at the
federal level, the state governments took matters into their own
hands. As of 2014, thirty-one states have enacted such official-English
132
laws. In various bills and constitutional amendments, many states
have brought into reality Senator Hayakawa’s vision of an officialEnglish polity, some going even further than he envisioned in
133
restricting foreign-language use.
B. Variance in State Legislation Regarding English-Only Policies
The nature of these state laws, and the attitude they evince
toward the use of languages other than English, range from
innocuous and vague to nefarious and incredibly restrictive. Some of
these laws are largely symbolic and have few practical impacts, while
others designate English as the language of official government
134
documents, procedures, and hearings. California’s constitution, for
instance, declares that “English is the common language of the people
of the United States and in the State of California,” and insists that
California pass “no law which diminishes or ignores the role of

he cofounded U.S. English, the organization responsible for many of the state laws discussed
below. See About U.S. English, U.S. ENGLISH, http://www.us-english.org/view/6 (last visited
Nov. 29, 2014).
128. See Josh Hill, Devin Ross & Brad Serafine, Watch Your Language! The Kansas Law
Review Survey of Official-English and English-Only Laws and Policies, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 669,
674 (2009).
129. 127 CONG. REC. 7444 (1981).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Hill et al., supra note 128, at 673.
133. Id. at 674.
134. Id. at 673–74.
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English as [its] common language.” Kentucky demonstrates less
hostility toward languages other than English. Its law merely
designates “English . . . as the official language of Kentucky,” and
136
says nothing more. Arizona’s English-only law is more forceful than
these examples in its stance toward official use of the English
language, however. Its constitution addresses English-language
primacy extensively, requiring that all government actions, with few
137
limitations, be “conducted in English.” The violation of Arizona’s
law by officials enables an individual to bring suit, under the terms of
138
the amendment, to enforce this policy.
Moreover, even when the enabling statutes are fairly toothless,
follow-up legislation may strengthen the force of language restrictions
within the initial law so as to more severely limit non-English
speakers’ ability to live and work freely within their communities. For
example, Kentucky’s relatively permissive law predated later
legislation that required that “[e]very writing contemplated by the
139
laws . . . be in the English language.” This more restrictive law, in
turn, prompted an attempt by the Kentucky Board of Elections to
ban the publishing of all election materials in any language other than
140
English.
Missouri serves as a further example of this trend. Missouri’s
English-adoption statute merely states that “English is the common
language used in Missouri . . . [and therefore] fluency in English is
141
necessary for full integration into our common American culture.”
In 2008, however, voters amended the state’s constitution to require
142
that all official government proceedings be conducted in English. In
2012, moreover, the Missouri House of Representatives approved
additional legislation requiring that driver’s-license examinations
143
“only be administered in the English language.” The proposed
legislation would have similarly forbidden officials from allowing “the
use of spoken language interpreters in connection with the written

135. CAL. CONST. art. III, § 6.
136. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2.013 (West 2010).
137. ARIZ. CONST. art. 28, §§ 1–6.
138. Id. § 6.
139. KY. REV. STAT. § 446.060 (West 2006).
140. Mark Flores, Note, English Only? The “Power” of Kentucky’s Official Language
Statute, 98 KY. L.J. 855, 859–60 (2010).
141. MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.028 (West 1999).
142. MO. CONST. art. I, § 34.
143. H.B. 1186, 96th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012).
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144

and driving tests.” Passed by a wide margin in the lower house, this
proposed bill was sent to the senate for approval, though it apparently
145
failed to take further action.
C. Exemptions for English-Language-Learner Programs
Despite this shift toward English-only state policies, even those
jurisdictions with the strictest laws allow foreign languages to be used
in the instruction of students with limited capacity in English.
Georgia’s law, for instance, states that “[t]he English language is
designated as the official language of the state,” but expressly allows
foreign-language use for “instruction designed to aid students with
146
limited English proficiency.” Idaho’s strict prohibition on the use of
foreign languages is likewise tempered by allowing public schools to
educate in a foreign language so that “[n]on-English speaking
children and adults . . . [may] read, write and understand English as
147
quickly as possible.” Arkansas, too, clarifies that its English-only
law “shall not prohibit the public schools from performing their duty
148
to provide equal educational opportunities to all children.”
149
The reason for these exceptions presumably lies in the EEOA.
Though many states have attempted to champion the English
language, the requirements of federal law have limited their ability to
promote it too vigorously, and have induced them to provide at least
partial accommodation for ELLs. Every state now provides some
form of ELL access, with the vast majority using the language
150
students speak at home to ensure they understand the curriculum.
Although the demographic figures discussed above may provide
only rough approximations of the great number of Americans who
speak a language other than English, they help explain why the
federal government has insisted on access to a meaningful education

144. Id.
145. Activity History for HB 1186, MISSOURI HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
http://house.mo.gov/BillActions.aspx?bill=HB1186&year=2012&code=R (last visited Nov. 29,
2014).
146. GA. CODE. ANN. § 50-3-100 (2013).
147. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-121 (2006 & Supp. 2014).
148. ARK. CODE ANN. § 1-4-117 (2008).
149. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1758 (2012).
150. OFFICE OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE ACQUISITION, LANGUAGE ENHANCEMENT AND
ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT FOR LIMITED ENGLISH PROFICIENT STUDENTS, BIENNIAL
EVALUATION REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STATE FORMULA
GRANT PROGRAM iv (2005).
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for these groups. Yet the federal government has not done enough.
As diversity in the United States continues to grow, and the hostility
toward these populations seemingly intensifies, Congress should not
allow the states to dictate what accommodations they will provide to
ELLs.
IV. THE NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT, HORNE V. FLORES, AND
INCREASED ACCEPTANCE OF STATE EXPERIMENTATION
A. The No Child Left Behind Act and its Impact on EnglishLanguage Learners
Since the passage of the EEOA in 1974, the next major change in
the area of ELL accommodation came with the passage of the No
Child Left Behind Act (NCLBA) in 2001. Enacting the NCLBA to
“close the achievement gap with accountability, flexibility, and
151
choice, so that no child is left behind,” Congress spoke specifically
to English language acquisition by ELLs. As part of this overhaul,
Congress replaced the Office of Bilingual Education and Minority
Language Affairs with the Office of English Language Acquisition,
Language Enhancement, and Academic Achievement for Limited
152
English Proficient Students. The NCLBA likewise granted states
substantial federal monies only if ELLs met “annual measurable
achievement objectives . . . [by] making yearly progress for limited
153
English proficient children.”
Importantly, the NCLBA replaced the earlier Bilingual
154
Education Act, which up to that point had been reauthorized four
155
times. Despite this undercutting of federal support for bilingual
education, however, the NCLBA did not strictly prohibit state
adoption of bilingual-education programs; in fact, Congress declined
to include such provisions, though some legislators attempted to
156
include such language. The NCLBA did, however, signal an
approval of state determination of the appropriate method of
educating ELLs.

151. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified at 20
U.S.C. § 6301 (2012)).
152. Cortes, supra note 96, at 107–08.
153. 20 U.S.C. § 6842 (2012).
154. Li, supra note 98, at 554.
155. Cortes, supra note 96, at 104–06.
156. Li, supra note 98, at 557.
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Apart from the NCLBA’s mandatory evaluations to ensure
students’ continued educational progress, and the vague requirement
that states’ methods of instruction be “scientifically based,” the
NCLBA explicitly states that it neither “mandate[s] nor preclude[s]
the use of a particular curricular or pedagogical approach to
157
educating limited English proficient children.” It likewise fails to
mandate a clear definition of which students qualify as ELLs, as well
158
as when such students should be deemed English-proficient. Thus,
although state creativity in the area of English-language instruction
was at one time cabined due to executive action that conditioned
compliance with federal law on the use of one model, as well as a
159
nationwide norm of bilingual education generally, Congress and the
courts have since retreated and allowed greater state experimentation
in this area. The impact of this move is potentially catastrophic, as
states can change accomodation without proper prior investigation.
ELL welfare may be sacrificed in favor of cheaper alternatives that
emphasize promotion of dominant culture in place of ensuring a
decent chance of educational success for this vulnerable subgroup.
B. Horne v. Flores: State Empowerment at English-LanguageLearner Expense
Although the NCLBA overhauled numerous aspects of federal
intervention into state educational policies, its interaction with and
impact upon the earlier EEOA remained an open question. The
Supreme Court decided this issue in 2009 in Horne.
Miriam Flores, a student at Coronado Elementary School in
160
Nogales, Arizona, could not speak English. Placed in an Englishonly classroom, she was forced to ask other Spanish-speaking
students to translate the lessons so she could understand their
161
meaning. Miriam’s teacher viewed these side-conversations as a
162
disruption to the class, and punished Miriam accordingly. After

157. 20 U.S.C. § 6849 (2012).
158. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., MEETING THE NEEDS OF ENGLISH LEARNERS AND OTHER
DIVERSE LEARNERS 6 (2010), available at http://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leg/blueprint/englishlearners-diverse-learners.pdf.
159. See Cortes, supra note 96, at 103–04 (“Federal legislation . . . began to express support
for bilingual education.”).
160. Tamar Lewin, End Is Near in a Fight on Teaching of English, N.Y. TIMES, May 20,
2009, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/20/education/20flores.html.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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learning of the lack of resources for Spanish-speaking children in
Nogales School District, Miriam’s mother banded together with
parents of other Nogales students to demand adequate
163
accommodation.
In Arizona, every child, regardless of the district in which he or
she lived, received the same base level of funding so as to guarantee a
164
minimum standard of education throughout the state. In addition to
the base-level funds, Arizona allocated additional yearly funds per
165
student to pay for resources to address the needs of ELLs. The town
166
of Nogales, located along the Mexican border, educated ELL
students with far less exposure to English and familiarity with the
167
language than students living in other areas of the state. These
especially high needs, coupled with a lack of adequate funding, meant
that the only way to rectify the ELL disadvantages in Nogales was to
168
shift state money away from non-ELL students. Although the state
had adjusted the base-level funding for all students to track inflation
169
on a yearly basis, albeit imperfectly and inadequately, it ignored
inflation for its ELLs by basing funding for their educational
170
enhancements on a 1987–1988 estimate.
The Flores plaintiffs, armed with this information, brought a
complaint against the state of Arizona and key state officials in the
federal court for the District of Arizona. The procedural history of
171
the case is complex. It involved a series of remands, a question of
changed circumstances due to a shift in state policy, and legislation
172
whose legality was being challenged on appeal. That history also
included the imposition of statewide injunctions to remedy an issue

163. Id.
164. See Flores v. Arizona, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1227 (D. Ariz. 2000). Still, districts could
vote to pass “overrides,” which allow for up to 10 percent more funding collected via additional
taxes. Id. at 1229. Wealthier districts fund overrides more often than less wealthy ones. Id. at
1230.
165. Id. at 1228.
166. Flores v. Arizona, 516 F.3d 1140, 1145 (9th Cir. 2008).
167. Flores, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 1228.
168. Id. at 1230.
169. Id. at 1227.
170. Id. at 1238. The 1987–1988 estimate suggested that the average amount of additional
funding for ELLs should have been $450 per year. The state fell well below that number; as of
2000, it was only granting an additional $150 per ELL. Id. at 1239.
171. Flores v. Rzeslawski, 204 Fed. App’x 580, 582 (9th Cir. 2006) (unpublished).
172. Id.
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raised by only one school district. The most essential facts are as
follows: in 2000, an Arizona district court found that the state’s
allocation of funding for ELLs was “arbitrary and not related to the
174
actual funding needed to cover the costs of [their] instruction.” On
remand to the district court after the Arizona legislature introduced a
new bill to change the standards and funding for ELLs, the districtcourt judge observed that the “No Child Left Behind Act . . . has to
some extent significantly changed State educators [sic] approach to
175
educating students in Arizona.”
Still, the law under consideration by the Arizona legislature,
House Bill 2064, provided that any student “classified as an English
Language Learner for more than two years” would lose additional
176
funds dedicated to ELLs for accommodation. The district court,
177
therefore, held that Arizona’s policy violated the EEOA.
Specifically, the court found that the bill’s two-year window to fund
ELLs was arbitrarily determined, especially given that such students
may take more than two years to become sufficiently skilled in
178
English. When the case reached its final appeal before the case
reached the Supreme Court, Arizona attempted to argue that “state
compliance with [No Child Left Behind] benchmarks” satisfied the
appropriate-action requirement of the EEOA, or even replaced it
179
altogether. The argument failed to convince the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which found that the statutes
performed functionally different roles—one guaranteed access to
education, whereas the other dealt uniquely with funding and
180
evaluating school programs. The panel likewise found that the two181
year cutoff was inconsistent with the EEOA.
After the Supreme Court finally heard the case of the Nogales
ELLs in Horne, its decision substantially weakened the holding of
Castaneda while it simultaneously emphasized the NCLBA’s
approval of experimentation. First, in a 5–4 holding, the Supreme

173. Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 470–71 (2009).
174. Id. at 433.
175. See Flores v. Arizona, 480 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1160–61 (D. Ariz. 2007).
176. H.B. 2064, 47th Leg, 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2006) (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15756.01(1)–(5)).
177. Flores, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 1167.
178. Id. at 1166–67.
179. Flores v. Arizona, 516 F.3d 1140, 1172 (9th Cir. 2008).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1180.
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Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit that the NCLBA did not
completely replace the EEOA, mainly due to the private right of
182
action the EEOA created. The majority also held unequivocally
that “appropriate action” does not require the “equalization of results
between native and nonnative speakers on tests administered in
183
English.” Finally, and most importantly, the Court noted that the
NCLBA “marks a shift in federal education policy . . . [r]eflecting a
growing consensus in education research that increased funding alone
184
does not improve student achievement.” As a result of Flores, the
states are free to experiment with accommodation, with the only
means of invalidating a state’s educational scheme being a look
backward at “demonstrated progress of students through
accountability reforms” to determine whether a school’s curriculum
185
has satisfied the strictures of the EEOA.
The dissent, however, found consideration of state funding to
ELLs to be one of three potentially dispositive means of evaluating
whether the state had undertaken appropriate action. Paralleling the
Castaneda analysis, Justice Breyer noted that the “resource issue that
the District Court focused upon [regarding funding ELL
curricula] . . . and the statutory subsection (f) issue that lies at the
186
heart of the court’s original judgment . . . are not different issues.”
At the very least, then, Justice Breyer’s vision of the Castaneda
analysis would allow a state’s proposed experiment to be invalidated
with some attention focused proactively. After the Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the Court remanded for further
factual findings as to whether Arizona’s new program adequately met
187
the EEOA benchmarks.
Flores’s impact is substantial. In dicta, the Court strongly
endorsed a move away from the second prong of the Castaneda test,
shifting the focus of judicial review from funding inputs to student
188
results and achievements. The Court also only made a few vague
references to whether Arizona’s mode of instructing ELLs was based
on sound educational theory, as required under the first Castaneda

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 462–63 (2009).
Id. at 467.
Id. at 464.
Id. at 465.
Id. at 485 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quotations omitted) (emphases omitted).
Id. at 472.
Id. at 463–64.
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189

prong. In undercutting Castaneda’s resources prong, the Court has
left the states ample room to experiment with accommodations for
ELLs. Disadvantaged students can only attain relief after an
experiment has detracted from their education.
In March of 2013, the District Court of Arizona dismissed the
Flores class’s claims, citing Horne v. Flores as affirmation that the
EEOA and NCLBA afford states “tremendous discretion and
190
flexibility” in determining how to adequately accommodate ELLs.
The district court’s decision on remand followed an additional change
in Arizona’s education policy that required ELLs to be segregated
from the rest of their classmates and instructed purely in English for
four hours each day, with little time left for academic instruction in
191
other subjects.
The Flores class appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit in
192
April of 2013. Notably, the Civil Rights Division of the Department
of Justice filed an amicus brief on the side of the appellants,
essentially attacking the district court’s application of the second and
third prongs of Castaneda and decrying Arizona’s practice of
193
segregating ELLs. The Civil Rights Division also noted that the
Supreme Court’s decision in Flores gave such “substantial
discretion . . . [to] the State” that it did not even address the issue of

189. Id. at 461 n.11. Justice Alito declared in the majority opinion that structured English
immersion, Arizona’s current method of educating ELLs, is “significantly more effective than
bilingual education.” Id. at 460–61. This portion of the opinion has engendered a significant
amount of controversy. See Maria-Daniel Asturias, Burden Shifting and Faulty Assumptions:
The Impact of Horne v. Flores on State Obligations to Adolescent ELLs under the EEOA, 55
HOW. L.J. 607, 624–25 (2012) (observing that the majority opinion’s only citation supporting the
superiority of Structured English Immersion came from Arizona’s legal briefing, which, in turn,
cited the Arizona school superintendent’s own testimony). The dissent, for its part, noted that
although there is significant support for finding structured English immersion to be the better
model, “there was considerable evidence the other way.” Horne, 557 U.S. at 500 (Breyer, J.
dissenting). For a comparative discussion of these models, see generally Cortes, supra note 96.
190. Press Release, Ariz. Dep’t of Educ. Office of Superintendent of Pub. Instruction John
Huppenthal, Court Rules in Favor of Superintendent in Flores Case (Mar. 29, 2013), available at
http://www.azed.gov/public-relations/files/2013/04/press-release-court-rules-in-favor-ofsuperintendent-in-flores-case.pdf.
191. Opening Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 54, Flores v. Arizona, No. 13-15805 (9th Cir.
Sept. 5, 2013).
192. Anne Ryman, Appeal Filed vs. Decision on Arizona’s English Language Learner
Programs, ARIZONA REPUBLIC (Apr. 25, 2013, 5:48 PM), http://www.azcentral.com/news/
arizona/articles/20130425appeal-filed-vs-decision-arizona-english-language-learnerprogram.html.
193. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants at 19−29,
Flores v. Huppenthal, No. 13-15805 (9th Cir. Sept. 13, 2013).
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the scientific bases the state used in promulgating its ELL education
194
standards. Although the Flores litigation is still pending, the case
demonstrates the uncertainties that ELLs face as to the
accommodations they will receive from the states. This uncertainty
alone is troubling. But given the states’ potentially hostile attitudes
toward these students, the potential results become even more
alarming.
V. THE TROUBLE WITH STATE EXPERIMENTATION
A. Laboratories of Democracy and Experimentation Gone Awry
“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a
single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
195
risk to the rest of the country.” With these words, Justice Brandeis
first expounded the now-standard notion that the states are
196
“laboratories of democracy.” State innovations, trials, and even
failures can serve the important purpose of aiding and informing
Congress as to how best to enhance the welfare of the American
people nationwide.
And the states have indeed experimented. Throughout history,
state law and legal theory have frequently influenced the federal
government as it seeks to produce the best policies for the American
people as a whole. For example, the Texas Constitution of 1845
197
allowed governors to sit for no more than two consecutive terms.
The federal government did not impose such a limit on its executive
198
branch until 1947—a full one hundred years later. States themselves
have also originated and developed the practice of imposing
legislative term limits, helping to curb the political reality of the
entrenchment of elected incumbents and creating greater turnover

194. Id. at 20 n.3.
195. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
196. Although Justice Brandeis never used the precise terminology quoted, the literature
has adopted it to describe the proposition put forward in the preceding sentence. See, e.g., Brian
Gale & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation in Decentralized
Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1335 (2009) (noting that “Justice Louis Brandeis famously
praised state and local governments as the ‘laboratories’ of democracy”).
197. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 4 (1845) (“The Governor . . . shall not be eligible [to serve in
office] for more than four years in any term of six years.”).
198. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1.
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199

within their representative bodies. The first states to adopt term
200
limits were Colorado, California, and Oklahoma in 1990. As of
201
2014, fifteen states have followed suit. Several federal legislators
seriously considered amending the U.S. Constitution so as to allow
for a similar cap on politicians in Washington D.C., but ultimately
202
failed to gain the necessary support in 1997. More recently,
Massachusetts’s healthcare legislation served as a model for the
203
Affordable Care Act, passed by Congress in 2010.
Not all experimentation, however, has so positively influenced
political discourse. Some of the topics with which the states have
experimented impact more than the continued presence of
incumbents in the state legislature. Many of these “experiments” have
been ill-conceived, and have instead hampered citizens’ access to
their most basic needs. When faced with the question of
accommodating disabled Americans, for example, the states failed to
204
provide equal access for this group. Congress forced their hand by
205
Racial
passing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.
segregation is another example of states exercising their plenary
powers, which ultimately required federal intervention to ameliorate
state-level wrongs. Throughout the Jim Crow era, for instance, states
“experimented” with the educational facilities provided to AfricanAmerican youth by separating them into segregated schools and
206
cutting state funding to nonwhite institutions. The legacy of such
policies remains, with white students outperforming nonwhite
students in great numbers even after federal intervention ended this
207
practice.
199. The Term Limited States, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/
research/about-state-legislatures/chart-of-term-limits-states.aspx (last visited Nov. 29, 2014).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Susan Heavey, Term Limits Take Effect, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1999,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/termlimits/termlimits.htm.
203. See Jonathan H. Adler, Interstate Competition and the Race to the Top, 35 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 89, 95 n.33 (2012) (“[S]uch a federal program [that adopts state policy] is the
Affordable Care Act.”).
204. Timothy M. Cook, The Americans With Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64
TEMP. L. REV. 393, 408–09 (1991).
205. Id. at 415.
206. Charles S. Bullock III & Janna Deitz, Transforming the South: The Role of the Federal
Government, in THE AMERICAN SOUTH IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 250 (Craig S. Pascoe,
Karen Trahan Leathem & Andy Ambrose eds., 2005)
TM
207. Kimberly Jade Norwood, Blackthink’s Acting White Stigma in Education and How It
Fosters Academic Paralysis in Black Youth, 50 HOW. L.J. 711, 713–14 (2007).
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In failing to limit state experimentation in the area of ELL
education, Congress and the Supreme Court have invited potentially
disastrous results. Education of those with limited English-language
proficiency is an especially challenging area. Allowing state education
programs to rely too much on a student’s native language might
208
undermine the student’s ability to learn English. This will almost
certainly undercut the student’s ability to achieve career success and
participate civically. Allowing state education programs to demand
that classes be predominantly taught in English might force English
upon children too strongly, making them unable to meaningfully
209
participate in classes, as with the student plaintiffs in Lau. A more
skilled body, one with greater distance from the people and that does
not directly bear the actual cost of ELL education, may be better
equipped to evaluate the accommodations given to ELLs. At least a
partial answer to these concerns rests with the federal government
mandating the accommodations these students receive. Education,
unlike legislative term limits or other areas in which the states
experiment, “is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively
and intelligently in our open political system . . . [to] preserve
210
freedom and independence.” At stake is whether these children will
be able to achieve success and self-dependence, and integrate into the
greater American society.
B. California: English-Language Experimentation Gone Wrong
Even before the states were armed with the NCLBA and the
Supreme Court’s decision in Horne, they experimented in their
“implementation” of appropriate action under the EEOA. By
affording the states leverage to conduct these experiments, Congress
allowed the adoption of new and untested policies at a statewide
level, which put millions of students in danger of losing their access to
211
education. California, which educates more ELLs than any other

208. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 158, at 3–6.
209. See supra notes 76–83 and accompanying text.
210. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972).
211. See Digest of Education Statistics Table 204.20 Number and Percentage of English
Language Learners, By State: Selected Years, 2002–03 through 2011–12, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC.
STATISTICS, http://www.nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d13/tables/dt13_204.20.asp (last visited
Nov. 29, 2014) (noting that from 2011 to 2012, over four million American students participated
in programs for ELLs).
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state, passed Proposition 227 in 1998. Proposition 227 decried
the bilingual-education system in place. Declaring that “[t]he public
schools of California . . . [had] wast[ed] financial resources” by
employing a bilingual-education policy that led to “high drop-out
rates and low English literacy levels of many immigrant children,” the
state resolved that “all children in California public schools shall be
215
taught English as rapidly and effectively as possible.” This “rapid
and effective” method involved one year of English immersion, with
students who speak non-English languages placed in a separate
216
classroom to learn English. After that year, Proposition 227
217
provided, ELLs would enter “mainstream classrooms.”
This proposition represented a sea change in the education of
ELLs in California. Although bilingual education had been the norm
218
for the previous thirty years, Proposition 227 effectively ended this
219
The
system to make way for structured English immersion.
California Department of Education ordered only a retroactive, five220
year study to review this novel state experiment in education. For
five years, then, California exposed all of its ELLs to an
221
underinformed shift in education policy in an effort to achieve
better educational outcomes while promoting English-language use in
222
the state. The results were underwhelming. The study merely
showed inconclusive changes in results for ELL progress, and
suggested that “[a] new framework [was] needed, one that [would]

212. T.B. PARRISH ET AL., AM. INSTS. FOR RESEARCH, HOW ARE ENGLISH LEARNERS
FARING UNDER PROPOSITION 227, at 3 (2006), available at http://www.air.org/sites/default/files/
downloads/report/How_are_ELs_faring_under_227_0.pdf.
213. CAL. SEC’Y OF ST., Statement of Vote: Primary Election June 2, 1998, at 86 (1988),
available at http://primary98.sos.ca.gov/Final/P98_SOV.pdf.
214. CAL. SEC’Y OF ST., English Language in Public Schools Initiative Statute,
http://primary98.sos.ca.gov/VoterGuide/Propositions/227text.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2014)
(codified at CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 300–340 (West 2002)).
215. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 300(f).
216. Id. § 305.
217. Id.
218. T.B. PARRISH ET AL., supra note 212, at 4.
219. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 330.
220. T.B. PARRISH ET AL., supra note 212, at 3.
221. In fact, an important federal study of bilingual education from that period suggested
that California’s previous system of education would be more effective than the state’s new
method of education. See JIM CUMMINS, THE ONTARIO INST. FOR STUDIES IN EDUC.,
BILINGUAL EDUCATION AND ENGLISH IMMERSION: THE RAMIREZ REPORT IN THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVE 97–99 (1992).
222. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 300(a)–(d) (West 2002).
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shift[] away from the bilingual-immersion debate to focus on the
larger array of factors that appear to make a difference for English
223
learner (EL) achievement.” Had the study indicated a decrease in
the language apprehension of ELLs, the fallout would have been
immense. Roughly 1.6 million ELLs would have suffered at the hands
224
of state-level experimentation.
California’s failure to adequately accommodate ELLs did not
end there, however. In addition to its hasty implementation of
English immersion upon its students, a state court in August 2014
found that there existed credible evidence that “districts are denying
225
required instructional services” to ELLs altogether. The court based
its decision on evidence that over twenty thousand Californian
language learners went without any kind of accommodation for their
226
learning needs.
Moreover, this broad-reaching experimentation is not unique to
227
228
California. Arizona
and Massachusetts,
like California,
abandoned bilingual education entirely in favor of an English-only
policy in 2000 and 2002, respectively. Arizona later continued its
statewide experiment in 2006, the results of which are still being
229
litigated as of 2014. Massachusetts, as of 2014, had yet to even
conduct a state-level survey of the impact of its legislation, and its
230
relative success as compared to the previous model. Whether or not
ulterior motives prompted these state-level reforms, the laws
completely rearranged the accommodation given to students who do
not speak English. Given the importance of education, the
vulnerability of ELLs, and the states’ poor track record in
experimenting with ELLs, federal policy must be bolstered to allow
prospective evaluation of state policy, in order to ensure that
experimentation is conducted in a responsible manner.
Experimentation undoubtedly has its place in continuing to
improve education initiatives. But it is a basic principle of proper

223. T.B. PARRISH ET AL., supra note 212, at 3.
224. Id.
225. D.J. v. California, No. BS142775, at *39 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 21, 2014).
226. Id. at 12–13.
227. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-751–752 (2014).
228. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 71A, §§ 1–4 (LexisNexis 2013 & Supp. 2014).
229. See supra notes 175–94 and accompanying text.
230. Qian Guo & Daniel Koretz, Estimating the Impact of the Massachusetts English
Immersion Law on Limited English Proficient Students’ Reading Achievement, EDUC. POLICY
121, 124–25, Jan. 2013.
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experimentation that new initiatives are not unleashed on a
population as a whole before they have been tested on a smaller
subset, or test group. There exists a trend in the literature, moreover,
to require stricter controls on state experimentation that impacts an
important right, due to the fear of violating that right through
231
imprudent shifts in policy. Education, given its important place in
American society, should be one such area in which experimentation
is highly scrutinized. By abandoning bilingual education in favor of
the new model of English immersion, California arguably turned its
students’ worlds upside down with little forethought and only a
backward glance. California then failed to provide any
accommodation for a great number of its students. Congress should
intervene either through the creation of agency evaluations or the use
of explicit standards, to specify how state districts should adequately
protect ELLs.
C. The English-Only Movement: Animus in Experimentation?
Ineffectual experimentation absent animus is sufficiently capable
of limiting the educational opportunities of vulnerable students. A
poorly planned or executed educational experiment designed by
policymakers with even the best intentions of aiding ELLs may still
leave students handicapped in their pursuit of education. Turning
these students over to the whims of state governments that may take
issue with their very presence in the country is even more troubling.
In other words, the English-only movement may have as one of its
goals more than a celebration of the “national language” of the
United States, and the hope that a common tongue will “pull[] people
232
together stronger.”
There are specific indications that the impetus behind the
English-only movement is more sinister than first appearances may
indicate. One example can be gleaned from the actions of John
Tanton, a cofounder of U.S. English, the English-only movement’s
most powerful lobbying group. In 1988, Tanton famously issued a
231. See, e.g., Alpheus Thomas Mason, Brandeis: A Personal History of an American Ideal,
50 HARV. L. REV. 370, 373 (1936) (discussing Justice Brandeis’s view that legislative
experimentation should not touch upon fundamental human and personal rights); see also
Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting and Democratic Values, 73 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1711, 1795 (2005) (“[E]xperimentation in the context of election administration must be
undertaken with the utmost care, given the fundamental character of the right to vote.”).
232. U.S. English Video, Why the U.S. Needs Official English—in 30 Seconds, YOUTUBE
(Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=daMhZBH1Um8.
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memorandum asking his peers pointedly, “In this society, will the
present majority peaceably hand over its political power to a group
that is simply more fertile? . . . Can homo contraceptivus compete
233
with homo progenitiva [sic] if borders aren’t controlled?” Tanton’s
tirade continued, declaring that “those with their pants up are going
234
to be caught by those [Hispanics] with their pants down.” Tanton
finally posited the ultimate question: he asked his followers directly,
“as whites see their power and control over their lives declining, will
they simply go quietly into the night? Or will there be an
235
Tanton formally disassociated himself from the
explosion?”
236
organization following the publication of these statements.
Senator Hayakawa, one of the most recognized voices of the
modern English-only movement in the United States, likewise made
questionable statements in his campaign for English-language
primacy. In one speech, he stated that “[n]o Filipinos [and] no
Koreans object to making English the official language[.] . . . [T]he
Vietnamese . . . are so damn happy to be here. They’re learning
English as fast as they can and winning spelling bees all across the
country. But the Hispanics have maintained there is a problem . . .
[because of them] we’re going to teach the kids in Spanish and we’ll
237
call that bilingual education.”
The leaders of the English-only movement were not the only
individuals with such misgivings toward the growing Hispanic
population. Incredibly, over 40 percent of supporters of the Englishonly movement polled in 1988 stated that their motivation for
advancing an official-English position was because of “Hispanics[,]
238
who shouldn’t be here.” An attitude, prevalent in the movement,
that Hispanics are a problem and that an official English-only policy
is the cure, has led civil-rights activist Raul Yzaguirre to declare that

233. JAMES CRAWFORD, LANGUAGE LOYALTIES: A SOURCE BOOK ON THE OFFICIAL
ENGLISH CONTROVERSY 172 (1992).
234. Flavia C. Peréa & Cynthia García Coll, The Social and Cultural Contexts of
Bilingualism, in AN INTRODUCTION TO BILINGUALISM, PRINCIPLES AND PROCESSES 220
(Jeanette Altarriba & Roberto R. Heredia eds., 2008).
235. Id.
236. See id.
237. JAMES CRAWFORD, HOLD YOUR TONGUE: BILINGUALISM AND THE POLITICS OF
“ENGLISH ONLY” 149–50 (1992).
238. Jennifer Bonilla Moreno, Note, Only English? How Bilingual Education Can Mitigate
the Damage of English-Only, 20 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 197, 200 (2012) (citation
omitted).

O’SULLIVAN IN PP (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

LABORATORIES FOR INEQUALITY

12/3/2014 2:24 PM

705

an effort to make the United States an English-only country is
239
essentially to declare that the country is for non-immigrants only.
Nor have these attitudes dissipated since the birth of the
movement. In 2004, former Colorado Governor Dick Lamm
addressed an immigration conference with a satirical “plan to destroy
America.” He argued that the United States’s downfall would come
from “encourag[ing] immigrants to maintain their culture . . . [and
from ascribing] the Black and Hispanic dropout rates” to “prejudice
240
and discrimination by the majority” alone. Particularly, Lamm
opposed the idea that immigrants should “keep their own language
and culture,” and posited that the United States’s celebration of
“diversity rather than unity” would debase its hegemonic Anglo241
American culture. Congressional attempts to declare English the
national language, though rejected, evince similar attitudes. As
recently as 2010, a member of the U.S. House of Representatives
likened multilingualism to a curse from God, and a punishment for
242
human pride.
Other possible motivations for the English-only movement may
be gleaned from looking at state action. Oklahoma’s push toward
strengthening the place of the English language perhaps best
demonstrates another proposed motivation for the English-only
movement, and the danger of allowing state experimentation in this
field. Specifically, the Oklahoma legislature drafted the Oklahoma
243
Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act of 2007 to discourage the
presence of “illegal immigra[nts] . . . [that are] causing economic
244
hardship and lawlessness” in the state. Thus, Oklahoma’s official245
English constitutional provision must be evaluated within the
greater context of Oklahoma’s recent legislation. Doing so, one
notices that not only did the state take a stand against the growing
presence of undocumented aliens, but the English-only amendment
239. LOURDES DIAZ SOTO, LANGUAGE, CULTURE, AND POWER: BILINGUAL FAMILIES
6 (1997).
240. GEORGE AUTRY JR., MALICE CLOAKED IN LIBERTY: THE KILLING OF AMERICA 309–
10 (2008).
241. Id.
242. 156 CONG. REC. H6863-05 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2010) (statement of Rep. King).
243. H.B. 1804, 51st Leg., 1st Sess. §§ 2–3 (Okla. 2007).
244. Id.
245. OK. CONST. art. 30, § 1. This provision cuts out an exception for “require[ments] by
federal law.” Id. Notably, however, it also states that “[n]o person shall have a cause of action
. . . for [a] failure to provide any official government action in any language other than English.”
Id.
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR QUALITY EDUCATION
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strongly suggests that the language of a large subset of these
246
individuals likewise had no place within the polity. States like
Oklahoma, simultaneously interested in cutting costs through
promoting the English language, discouraging the presence of
undocumented aliens, and encouraging the assimilation of legal
247
immigrants, may very well favor cheap, rapid promotion of English
despite indications that such a system may not best serve ELLs.
D. The Federal Government as the Appropriate Guarantor of
Adequate Accommodation
Some may find increasing federal control over education policy
to be troubling, primarily because schooling has traditionally been the
248
bailiwick of the states. Inconclusive data regarding federal grants’
effect on the quality of education have similarly led critics to decry
249
existing federal incursions into education.
In particular, the
Department of Education’s sole role of supervising grants to
education, while it “has no teachers and runs no schools,” raises
250
questions of bureaucratic efficiency.
Despite these criticisms,
federal intervention has increased piecemeal since the 1960s, with the
NCLBA signaling immense growth in federal involvement in
251
education through conditional grants to the states.
Likewise, the propriety of federal intervention is confirmed by
the fact that Congress is “less responsive” than the state governments.
Because Congress represents a larger polity composed of more
diverse individuals with more diverse ideas, the federal government is
less likely to become beholden to the whims of special-interest
252
groups. The existence of the initiative and popular referendum
253
systems of lawmaking in a number of states exacerbates the

246. Donathan Brown, Legislating in the Name of National Unity: An Oklahoma Story, 13
INT’L J. DISCRIMINATION & L. 4, 12 (2013).
247. Id. at 11.
248. See supra notes 68–71 and accompanying text.
249. NEAL MCCLUSKEY, CATO INST., DOWNSIZING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: K-12
EDUCATION SUBSIDIES 3 (2009), http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/education/k-12education-subsidies.
250. Id. at 4.
251. Neil King Jr., Obama Plan Calls for Education-Funding Increase, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2,
2010, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704107204575039090128849972.
252. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499, 527–29 (1995)
(citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)).
253. In many states,
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“closeness” between the people and the lawmaking process, through
254
the means of direct democracy for questions of legislation. This
closeness, still, remains prone to bias and control by special interests,
allowing the most vulnerable groups to fall prey to the whim of the
255
more powerful factions of society.
That federal intervention has assisted students long denied
adequate protection by state authorities illustrates the proposition
that the federal government plays a role in protecting vulnerable
groups from state caprice. Although equality of outcome in
educational results has not been achieved, equality of access to
similar educational facilities has been bolstered by legislation and
executive orders handed down from the federal government that
256
undercut state action and supplant state inaction. The NCLBA,
despite its problems, did indeed “[bring] unprecedented attention to
257
Limited English Proficient (LEP) students as a distinct subgroup.”
Congressional inaction on English-only policies further attests to
the federal government’s superiority as a guarantor of minority rights.
Time and again, various members of Congress have proposed
legislation to make English the official language of the federal
258
government. One such example is the “English Language Unity Act
259
of 2013.” After being introduced in the House of Representatives
on March 6, 2013, this particular piece of legislation appears to have

[v]oters may act [directly] as legislators . . . . In an initiative a specified number of
voters petition to propose statutes or constitutional amendments to be adopted or
rejected by the voters at the polls. In a popular referendum a specified number of
voters can petition to refer a legislative action to the voters at the polls.
DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES 1 (1984).
254. See PHILIP L. DUBOIS & FLOYD FEENEY, LAWMAKING BY INITIATIVE: ISSUES,
OPINIONS AND COMPARISONS 1–2 (1998) (noting that some “question the wisdom of the
initiative. In their view, societal problems have become much too complicated for the black and
white kind of solutions they believe possible through use of the initiative process”).
255. MAGLEBY, supra note 253, at 120–21.
256. See, e.g., Neal Devins & James B. Stedman, New Federalism in Education: The Meaning
of the Chicago School Desegregation Cases, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1243, 1245 (1984)
(“Federal financial assistance to elementary and secondary schools was critical to achieving the
first substantial breaches in the southern system of segregated schools.”).
257. Nw. Reg’l Educ. Lab., The Next Step: Assessment and the English Language Learner,
¡COLORÍN COLORADO!, http://www.colorincolorado.org/article/14733 (last visited Nov. 29,
2014).
258. For an updated compilation of proposed legislation aimed at creating an officialEnglish policy at the national level, see Federal Legislation, U.S. ENGLISH, http://www.usenglish.org/view/310 (last visited Nov. 29, 2014).
259. H.R. 997, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).
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Whereas English-only laws have gained
died in committee.
approbation across the states, federal attempts failed to move out of
even the most cursory steps toward serious consideration.
Congress’s immense amount of deference toward the states
keeps with traditional notions of federalism but ignores the modern
reality of federal involvement in education. The NCLBA statutorily
declared a policy of deference to the states determining their own
standards for ELL education. However, given the increasing amount
of funding from federal sources in state public schools, increased
federal control appears more appropriate. In 2011–2012, roughly 88
percent of all funds spent on public elementary- and secondary261
education came from the state, local and private sources. Close to
11 percent of funds came from the Department of Education and
262
other federal agencies. Although this latter number may seem
minuscule at first blush, this figure represents a dramatic increase in
federal funding as compared to previous years. In 1990, the federal
government doled out only between 5 and 6 percent of the money
263
spent in public schools. In the mid-2000s, the federal government
264
provided 8 percent of all funds. Though state acceptance of federal
265
funds does not create a contract between the respective sovereigns,
the logic of “consideration for consideration” is applicable here. As
federal funding increases, one should expect federal control over state
education policies to increase as well.
Education has not only become increasingly subsidized by the
federal government, but has also become increasingly standardized at
the national level. Most recently, the federal government has set aside
additional funds to encourage state adoption of an education program
called the Common Core State Standards Initiative (Common
266
Core). This national curriculum aims to better prepare students for
the rigors of applying to and attending college, and specifically targets
260. H.R. 997—English Language Unity Act of 2013, CONGRESS.GOV, http://beta.congress.
gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/997/all-actions (last visited Nov. 29, 2014).
261. Federal Role in Education, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/
fed/role.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2014).
262. Id.
263. 10 Facts About K-12 Education Funding, Archived Information, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/fed/10facts/index.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2014).
264. Id.
265. Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1661 (2011).
266. Celia R. Baker, The Conservative Battle over Common Core Standards, DESERET
NEWS, Jan. 2, 2014, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865593349/The-conservative-battleover-Common-Core.html.
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267

Common Core
English and Mathematics for standardization.
originated from the National Governors Association and the Council
of Chief State School Officers, and proponents of this nationalized
plan stress that the “federal government was not involved in the
268
development of the standards.” Still, participating states are eligible
to receive a piece of the nearly three-and-a-half billion dollars the
269
federal government has allotted for the program. North Carolina,
for instance, received four hundred million dollars after agreeing to
270
adopt these nationalized educational standards. Forty-four other
states have adopted this curriculum, as have the District of Columbia
271
and four territories. Although Common Core has received its fair
272
share of criticism, the trend as of 2014 is toward a nationalization of
education standards that moves away from statewide
experimentation—at the very least, in Mathematics and English.
The federal government today is more involved in education
than at any time before. Moreover, there has been a federally
sponsored movement away from state-by-state control over
educational topics. These factors suggest that the federal government
is the appropriate arbiter of disputes between ELLs and the school
districts. One important question remains, however—how can the
federal government best undertake such a responsibility?
VI. PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE
The federal government should intervene on behalf of ELLs by
creating a meaningful opportunity for them to vindicate their rights in
the classroom. Although the EEOA was an important landmark in

267. See Introduction to the Common Core State Standards, COMMON CORE STATE
STANDARDS INITIATIVE, http://www.corestandards.org/assets/ccssi-introduction.pdf (last visited
Nov. 29, 2014) (explaining that the standards address the topics of “English language arts and
mathematics” so that “high school graduates . . . [can] succeed in college and careers”).
268. Frequently Asked Questions, COMMON CORE STATE STANDARDS INITIATIVE,
http://www.corestandards.org/resources/frequently-asked-questions (last visited Nov. 29, 2014).
269. Preston Spencer, Battle Over Common Core Curriculum Continues, STATESVILLE REC.
& LANDMARK (Dec. 22, 2013, 2:07 PM), http://www.statesville.com/news/education/
article_d4a54e86-68e0-11e3-8f8d-0019bb30f31a.html.
270. Id.
271. Standards in Your State, COMMON CORE STATE STANDARDS INITIATIVE,
http://www.corestandards.org/in-the-states (last visited Nov. 29, 2014).
272. See, e.g., Sam Dillon, Bipartisan Group Backs Common School Curriculum, N.Y.
TIMES LATE ED., Mar. 7, 2011, at A12 (“A number of prominent Republicans . . . [who] believe
in local control, are suspicious of the standards movement and seem likely to oppose the
common-curriculum proposal.”).
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recognizing and proscribing the unequal treatment ELLs face in
attaining education, the definition of “appropriate action” contained
therein has proven to be overly vague. The enforcement mechanism,
too, is far too lax. This Note suggests two options for future
legislation. The federal government could specify precisely what form
of accommodation the states must provide, creating a national policy
for ELLs in step with the nationalization of English and mathematics
instruction under the Common Core standards. Or, alternatively, the
federal government could severely cabin the states’ power to
undertake new experiments in education and diligently observe those
experiments. This second purpose could be achieved by creating an
efficient forum for prospective evaluation of changes in state policy.
A. Direct Federal Control Over English-Language-Learner
Accommodation
Experimentation has its place in the development of sound
education strategies, and it is possible that a more effective method of
educating ELLs may exist than bilingual education. But allowing the
states—some of which have passed laws intended to hurt ELLs—to
freely experiment with millions of lives is not the appropriate way to
refine education policy. The federal government could itself conduct
and supervise research to determine how best to implement the
EEOA’s “appropriate action” standard, and do so in a manner that
reduces the number of students impacted by such studies. The results
of this limited experimentation would then inform a national standard
that the states could adopt as the appropriate method for educating
ELL populations. Only after federal observation and formulation of
educational policy, therefore, should the states adopt new methods of
education, ensuring that all ELLs would receive the same
accommodations to increase their chances of learning English and
succeeding in the outside world.
Previous scholarship has suggested that the Department of
Education should “promulgate regulations” to better define the
273
accommodation ELLs shall receive. The Department of Education
could likewise assume responsibility for the research and evaluation
of various educational programs for ELLs. With this responsibility,
instead of merely doling out money to the state public schools, as
274
critics claim, the Department of Education could protect the rights
273. Asturias, supra note 189, at 640–41.
274. MCCLUSKEY, supra note 249, at 4–5.
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of individual ELLs against state action designed to impair those
rights. In the same way that the federal government has supported a
275
nationalized curriculum in the areas of English and mathematics,
the Department of Education’s research could then inform the
implementation of the federally imposed requirement of “appropriate
action” under the EEOA. In the interim, Congress should condition
funds for ELLs so as to allow the states little latitude from
experimenting in this area altogether. Although bilingual education
may not work perfectly, it has been shown to be somewhat
276
successful. This more promising method of ensuring adequate
accommodation of ELLs should not be discarded until an alternative
strategy is tried, tested, and proven in a responsible manner by the
federal government.
B. Substantial Federal Supervision of State Experimentation
If Congress still desires some level of state experimentation and
freedom in the area of English-language learning, the federal
government should exercise some oversight before a state implements
changes to its curriculum. In other words, the federal government
should restore and strengthen the first and second prongs of the
Castaneda test, but place it within an agency framework, so as to
require a prospective expert-backed evaluation of state
experimentation before its commencement.
The federal government has previously created a streamlined
administrative-adjudication structure in the area of federal labor law.
For, although there is no question that regulating the industries
277
within a state is the domain of that state, state governments have
proven ineffective at protecting the interests of organized labor. To
prevent strikes, boycotts, and other forms of economic warfare, state
courts have frequently issued injunctions against the unions that
278
initially requested relief from the state governments. Although

275. See supra notes 266–72.
276. See Li, supra note 98, at 570 (“ELL students can attain English proficiency through
both English immersion and bilingual programs, but bilingual programs have proven most
effective.”).
277. See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 81 (1937)
(McReynolds, J., dissenting) (“The making and fabrication of steel by the Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corporation is production regulable by the state of Pennsylvania.”).
278. See William E. Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1109, 1219–20 (1989) (discussing prolabor anti-injunction and anticonspiracy laws passed
by states in the late 1890s and early 1900s).
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fruitful in some instances, these efforts were generally unsuccessful
279
because the specter of organized labor “disturbed lawmakers.” Prounion lobbyists, however, gained serious traction in petitioning
280
Congress for labor reform in 1928.
Congress did intervene when it passed the National Labor
281
Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA). The NLRA barred the courts from
using injunctions in nonviolent labor disputes and declared that the
“policy of the United States [was] to . . . encourag[e] the practice and
282
procedure of collective bargaining.” It likewise created a process of
adjudication for allegations of unfair labor tactics that impinge upon
283
employees’ ability to bargain collectively. Under the NLRA, after
an employee or employer files an unfair-labor charge, the General
Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, appointed by the
president and charged with the prosecution of unfair labor practices,
284
investigates the claim to ensure that it is meritorious.
An
administrative-law judge then hears both sides’ arguments and
285
renders a decision. This decision is filed with the National Labor
286
Relations Board, whose decision is further reviewable in a federal
287
court of appeals.
The federal government similarly regulated interactions between
private employers when it created the United States Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in 1965. To ensure
enforcement of the guarantees enshrined in the Civil Rights Act of
1964, Congress created the EEOC and empowered a general counsel
288
to “conduct . . . litigation” to that effect.
The EEOC, after
investigating the validity of a claim of workplace discrimination, may
bring suit in federal court on behalf of a victim to vindicate his or her

279. Id.
280. Id. at 1227–28.
281. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), Pub L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012)).
282. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
283. Id. § 160.
284. Jonathan B. Rosenblum, A New Look at the General Counsel’s Unreviewable
Discretion Not to Issue a Complaint Under the NLRA, 86 YALE L.J. 1349, 1353 (1977).
285. David C. Fairchild, Successorship Doctrine: A Hybrid Approach Threatens to Extend
the Doctrine When the Union Strikes Out, 28 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 263, 278 n.106 (1984) (“An
Administrative Law Judge . . . presides over a hearing concerning violations of the [NLRA].”).
286. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2012).
287. Id. § 160(f).
288. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(b)(1) (2012).
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289

rights. The EEOC also visits workplaces to “prevent discrimination
before it occurs through outreach, educational and technical
290
assistance programs.”
The Supreme Court recently declared the unconstitutionality of
291
a somewhat similar proposal in Shelby County v. Holder. Since
1965, federal law had required a form of “pre-approval” of certain
states’ plans of Congressional-district drawing before they went into
292
effect. Congress had enacted and reauthorized this regime as a
293
means of “addressing entrenched racial discrimination in voting.”
Employing the Fifteenth Amendment’s authorization to Congress to
enforce its strictures by use of “appropriate legislation,” federal
legislators imposed these requirements on offending states without
their consent. The Court ultimately struck down the law on various
grounds, one of which was its betrayal of the traditional
understanding that the Tenth Amendment allowed the states “to
determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be
294
exercised.” The Court likewise found inappropriate the Voting
295
Rights Act’s application to some states and not others. The unique
burdens placed upon those states identified under the law violated the
296
“‘fundamental principle of equal sovereignty’ among the [s]tates.”
This proposal likewise suggests that the states should obtain
preclearance before enacting laws. However, whereas the Voting
Rights Act imposed requirements upon the states through the
Fifteenth Amendment and absent their consent, this Note suggests
that the federal government attach its preclearance standards as a
condition of federal funding. The impact of Shelby County on
conditional-funding schemes has not been developed, though the
Court’s holding certainly implicates issues outside of Congress’s
spending power. Moreover, this proposal does not suggest the
“targeting” of only those states with poor records of ELL
accommodation, such as California. The equal-sovereignty doctrine,

289. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, The Charge Handling Process,
http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/process.cfm (last visited Nov. 29, 2014).
290. About the EEOC: Overview, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc (last visited Nov. 29, 2014).
291. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
292. Id. at 2618.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 2623−24.
295. Id. at 2623.
296. Id. (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009)).
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then, would likewise not be implicated even if it were to apply to
297
congressional-funding schemes.
Absent an indication to the contrary, it appears that there is no
particular reason why the federal government must follow the
historical allocation of federal–state power in the field of education; it
possesses the funds states desperately need for their schools, and it
298
can condition such monies virtually free of limitation. Still, if the
federal government chooses to avoid directly ordering the states to
follow necessary regulations, then the Department of Education
could also become an informal adjudicator that reviews states’
proposed education plans and education-plan experiments before
they take effect. Such a review mechanism would prevent the states
from drastically shifting their entire ELL policies in a six-month
period, as California did in the 1990s.
CONCLUSION
Though state governments have carried the responsibility of
providing public education since the early days of this country, they
have proven unable to protect the interests of the very people to
whom they have shown disfavor. Although Congress passed the
EEOA with the intention of increasing ELL access to education, that
law has seemingly become a dead letter—imposing federal control
over ELL education without providing any meaningful method of
limiting state action until after English-language students fail. In
today’s climate of increasing English-only sentiment in many states,
and with mounting empirical evidence of state mismanagement in
educational experimentation, the federal government can and should
step in to protect ELLs. Direct intervention would align with current
trends of state–federal interaction in education, in keeping with
297. See id. (noting that “the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty” only attaches
when “assessing . . . disparate treatment of the States” (emphasis added)).
298. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), did note that “financial inducement[s] by
Congress might be so coercive as to pass” into unconstitutional territory. Id. at 211. For the first
time ever, the Court in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566
(2012), found a federal funding arrangement coercive. Id. at 1604–05. Although this decision
raises the specter that Congress’s conditioning of school funds might violate the Spending
Clause, this possibility is unlikely. See Eloise Pasachoff, Conditional Spending After NFIB v.
Sebelius: The Example of Federal Education Law, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 577, 648−51 (2013) (noting
that “federal education dollars occupy a different space in the political landscape than do
federal Medicaid dollars”). Federal funding accounts for far too small a percentage of states’
overall budget, and education’s place within federal−state relations is likewise too unique, for
this to be a serious concern. Id. at 622–23.
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recent trends in the nationalization of education standards and the
increasing use of federal funds to subsidize public education.
With the passage of the NCLBA, the evisceration of the inputs
prong of the Castaneda test, and the Supreme Court’s allowing of
Arizona’s and other states’ experimentation in education, it appears
that the federal judiciary’s interpretations of federal education
standards no longer adequately protect ELL rights. Students must
now wait to fail before federal courts will enjoin any state
experiments impacting scores of the United States’s most vulnerable
students. Congress should step in, at a minimum by itself defining
“appropriate action” so as to confine the scope of state
experimentation. As a second possibility, the federal government
should research ways to innovate and improve ELL education. The
Department of Education could use such research to inform a
national ELL-education policy.
Plyler v. Doe emphasized the plight of only the undocumentedimmigrant population. Its spirit, however, resonates with the struggle
for adequate educational standards for the ELLs, some of whom
make up a part of the undocumented population at issue in that case.
299
The “specter of a permanent caste” of students who have been
mistreated by states’ educational experiments should stir the federal
government into action. Although the United States has failed this
subgroup in the past, relieving the states of the burden of determining
exactly how they would educate ELLs would go a long way toward
ensuring that every child in the United States, regardless of initial
language ability, retains the opportunity for future success.

299. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218–19 (1982).

